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TAKING DISTINCTION TO THE NEXT LEVEL:
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR FIGHTERS’ FAILURE
TO DISTINGUISH THEMSELVES FROM
CIVILIANS
Laurie R. Blank*
I. INTRODUCTION
Suicide bombings, terrorist attacks, rockets launched from civilian
residences, weapons stored in mosques or hospitals—these now
common news stories from conflicts share one common thread: the
erosion of the distinction between fighter and civilian during armed
conflict. The principle of distinction is one of the fundamental principles
of the law of armed conflict (“LOAC”) and obligates all parties to a
conflict to distinguish between combatants and civilians—between those
who are fighting and those who are not. The Geneva Conventions
establish a framework based on this distinction: Combatants are entitled
to participate in hostilities, and are also legitimate targets of attack at all
times; civilians are immune from attack unless and for so long as they
participate directly in hostilities. This distinction lies at the heart of the
law governing warfare.
The nature of recent conflicts and the “civilianization” of the
battlefield have thus led many to question the effectiveness of distinction
going forward, in essence challenging the very foundations of LOAC.
Indeed, the use of tactics that ignore this distinction have led some to call
for new rules to govern warfare or for revisions to the existing law of
war to address the challenges of contemporary conflict with terrorist
groups and other non-state actors. But is distinction truly on the
defensive, or do we simply need to rethink how we approach this most
fundamental protective principle?
Indeed, without a deep and unwavering commitment to distinction
and its central place in the law of war, the horrors and atrocities of
armed conflict in the past century may well become merely a prelude.
LOAC, otherwise known as international humanitarian law or the law of
war, applies to situations of armed conflict and governs the conduct of
hostilities and the protection of persons during conflict.1 Distinction is
Director, International Humanitarian Law Clinic, Emory University School of Law.
See War and International Humanitarian Law, ICRC (Sept. 23, 2011),
http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/overview-war-and-law.htm. The law of armed
conflict is set forth primarily in the four Geneva Conventions of August 14, 1949 and their
Additional Protocols: Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),

*

1

765

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 3 [2012], Art. 3

766

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

one of the “intransgressible principles” of LOAC and the building block
upon which so many other key provisions and principles of the law are
founded.2 The first critical step is to recognize that the principle of
distinction mandates that we distinguish between and among civilians—
between those who are legitimate targets of attack and those who are
innocent civilians deserving of every protection during the conduct of
hostilities.
However, trumpeting the obligation to distinguish between
combatants and civilians and then bemoaning the blurred and complex
nature of the zone of combat, in which fighters purposely blend into the
civilian population and fight from within the civilian infrastructure,
simply falls short of the mark. The principle of distinction has two parts.
It is not sufficient simply to distinguish between innocent civilians and
legitimate targets in the targeting process. Persons who are fighting
must also distinguish themselves from those who are not fighting so as
to ensure and maximize the protection of innocent civilians. The nature
of contemporary conflicts demands that we take distinction to the next
level and hold non-state actors and others accountable for the failure to
distinguish themselves from innocent civilians. The essential next step,
therefore, is to reinforce this distinction—not only in the conduct of
hostilities but also in the post-conflict accountability phase. International
criminal tribunals have issued numerous convictions and sentences for
deliberate targeting of civilians, indiscriminate attacks on civilians, and
disproportionate attacks on civilians—all violations of the principle of
distinction. However, accountability for violations in this second part of
distinction, which this Article will refer to as distinction in conduct, lags
far behind.
This Article explores how the failure to hold persons accountable for
perfidy and other violations of the obligation to distinguish will continue
to undermine the ability of the law to provide maximum protection to
innocent civilians during armed conflict. These violations pose an equal
adopted by Conference June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]; Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), adopted by Conference June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter GC I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GC II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III]; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV].
2
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. ¶ 79
(July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons].
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danger to civilians when soldiers cannot tell who is an innocent civilian
and who is a fighter simply disguised in civilian clothes. When militants
benefit both tactically and strategically from the use of the civilian
population as a shield and as a disguise, the international community
must take distinction to the next level and demand accountability for
such violations as a critical step in the protection of civilians during
armed conflict.
The first section of this Article sets forth the parameters of the
principle of distinction and how LOAC implements this fundamental
principle. In addition, the first section explores the challenges and
complexities of contemporary warfare, specifically with relation to the
obligations of distinction. The second section addresses current trends
and efforts in the implementation and enforcement of the principle of
distinction.
Militaries operationalize distinction through rules of
engagement that focus on the concepts of hostile act and hostile intent,
rather than the formal legal distinction between civilian and combatant.
The jurisprudence of the international criminal tribunals—as well as
other courts and tribunals—includes extensive precedent regarding the
obligations of distinction in targeting.
However, this wealth of
jurisprudence does not extend to violations of the obligations all parties
have to distinguish themselves from innocent civilians, creating a range
of risks for civilians and soldiers alike. Finally, this Article highlights
LOAC’s untapped potential, a gap resulting from the failure to enforce
distinction on both sides of the coin.
II. DISTINCTION: PAST AND PRESENT
One of the most fundamental issues during conflict is identifying
who or what can be targeted. The principle of distinction, one of the
“cardinal principles of [international humanitarian law],” requires that
any party to a conflict distinguish between those who are fighting and
those who are not, and direct attacks solely at the former.3 Similarly,
parties must distinguish between civilian objects and military objects
and target only the latter.
Distinction has a long pedigree and has been a central tenet of
warfare for thousands of years. Many ancient codes of conduct during
wartime differentiated in some way between those who could be killed
and those who must be spared.4 For example, in his orders to his
Id. ¶ 78 (Higgins, J., dissenting) (declaring that distinction and the prohibition on
unnecessary suffering are the two cardinal principles of international humanitarian law).
4
See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 42 (1977) (“[T]he general conception of
war as a combat between combatants . . . turns up again and again in anthropological and
historical accounts.”). For example, the Mahabharata text tracing the history of the
3
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commanders, the first caliph, Abu Bakr, stated, “‘[t]he blood of women,
children and old people shall not stain your victory.’”5 The Greeks
considered the temples, embassies, priests, and envoys of the opposite
side inviolable.6 Beginning with Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas,
early legal theorists began to set forth a framework for who could be
killed during armed conflict—the underpinnings of today’s principle of
distinction. Thus, St. Thomas Aquinas declared that “it is no way lawful
During the Enlightenment, Jean-Jacques
to slay the innocent.”7
Rousseau advanced this thinking significantly, focusing primarily on
distinguishing between those who bore arms and those who did not. In
this way, Rousseau formulated the principle of noncombatant immunity
in terms that remain vital and recognizable today:
Since the purpose of war is to destroy the enemy State, it
is legitimate to kill the latter’s defenders so long as they
are carrying arms; but as soon as they lay them down and
surrender, they cease to be enemies or agents of the
enemy, and again become mere men, and it is no longer
legitimate to take their lives.8
Although early wars were often uncompromising in their brutality, these
early moral, religious, and legal precepts and teachings established a
firm foundation for the modern law of war and the notion of
discrimination between and among persons on the battlefield.

Kurukshetra War stated, “[h]e is no son of the Vishni race who slayeth a woman, a boy or
an old man.” L.C. Green, Enforcement of the Law in International and Non-International
Conflicts—The Way Ahead, 24 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 285, 287 (1996). Similarly, the
prophet Elisha warned the king against the killing of civilians: “[W]hen thou comest nigh
unto a city to fight against it, . . . thou shalt smite every male therof with the edge of the
sword: But the women, and the little ones, and the cattle, and all that is in the city . . . shalt
thou take unto thyself . . . .” L.C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 21
(1993) [hereinafter THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT]. Also, the Code of
Hammurabi ordered “protection of the weak against oppression by the strong and ordered
that hostages be released on payment of a ransom.” Christopher Greenwood, Historical
Development and Legal Basis, in THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED
CONFLICTS 12 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995).
5
Greenwood, supra note 4, at 14.
6
Id. at 13; see THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 4, at 19
(discussing how Elisha warned the king against the killing of civilians).
7
2 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Question XL, Sixth Article (Benziger
Bros. ed., Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., 1947).
8
Daphne Richemond-Barak, Nonstate Actors in Armed Conflicts: Issues of Distinction and
Reciprocity, in NEW BATTLEFIELDS, OLD LAWS: FROM THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS TO
ASYMMETRIC WARFARE 10 (William C. Banks ed., 2011) (quoting JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU,
DU CONTRAT SOCIAL [THE SOCIAL CONTRACT] 111 (1762)).
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A. Distinction in LOAC: The Basics
In the modern law of war, distinction was first set forth in Article 22
of the Lieber Code, the first codification of the law of war, which was
drafted during the U.S. Civil War:
Nevertheless, as civilization has advanced during the
last centuries, so has likewise steadily advanced,
especially in war on land, the distinction between the
private individual belonging to a hostile country and the
hostile country itself, with its men in arms. The
principle has been more and more acknowledged that
the unarmed citizen is to be spared in person, property,
and honor as much as the exigencies of war will admit.9
A few short years later, the international community reinforced the
rule in the St. Petersburg Declaration, which stated “[t]hat the only
legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish during
war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy.”10 Although the
overall purpose of the St. Petersburg Declaration was the prohibition of
weapons causing unnecessary suffering for combatants, this provision
confirms the immunity of the civilian population from attack.
Neither the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 nor the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 contain specific statements of the principle of
distinction, but its force as customary law remained in effect. By 1977,
when the Additional Protocols were drafted, the nature of warfare
demonstrated the need for a clear restatement of the principle of
distinction and reinforcement of its central role in LOAC. Article 48 of
Additional Protocol I thus sets forth the basic rule: “In order to ensure
respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects,
the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the
civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and
military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only
against military objectives.”11

FRANCIS LIEBER, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED
STATES IN THE FIELD art. 22, at 9 (1898), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_
Law/pdf/Instructions-gov-armies.pdf [hereinafter LIEBER CODE].
10
Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400
Grammes Weight pmbl., Nov. 29, 1868, reprinted in Official Documents, 1 AM. J. INT’L L.
SUPP. 87, 95 (1907) [hereinafter St. Petersburg Declaration].
11
AP I, supra note 1, art. 48. Article 48 is considered customary international law. See 1
JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS AND LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW Rule 1, at 3–4 (2005) [hereinafter CIHL], available at
9
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Distinction lies at the core of LOAC’s seminal goal of protecting
innocent civilians and persons who are hors de combat. The obligation to
distinguish forms part of the customary international law of both
international and non-international armed conflicts—as the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) held in Tadic.12 As
a result, all parties to any conflict are obligated to distinguish between
combatants, or fighters, and civilians, and concomitantly, to distinguish
themselves from civilians, and their own military objects from civilian
objects.13 The purpose of distinction, to protect civilians, is emphasized
in Article 51 of Additional Protocol I, which states that “[t]he civilian
population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object
of attack.”14 Article 51 continues, stating:
Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate
attacks are:
(a) [t]hose which are not directed at a specific military
objective;
(b) [t]hose which employ a method or means of combat
which cannot be directed at a specific military objective;
or

http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/customary-international-humanitarian-lawi-icrc-eng.pdf.
12
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 111, 127 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2,
1995) (citing U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2675). The decision states that:
Bearing in mind the need for measures to ensure the better protection
of human rights in armed conflicts of all types, [ . . . the General
Assembly] Affirms the following basic principles for the protection of
civilian populations in armed conflicts, without prejudice to their
future elaboration within the framework of progressive development
of the international law of armed conflict:
....
2. In the conduct of military operations during armed conflicts, a
distinction must be made at all times between persons actively taking
part in the hostilities and civilian populations.
Id. (alteration in original); see Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
Report No. 55/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 178 (1997); Nuclear Weapons, supra
note 2, ¶ 79 (distinction is one of the “intransgressible principles of international customary
law”); CIHL, supra note 11, Rule 1 (explaining that the principle of distinction is customary
international law in all types of armed conflicts).
13
U.S. DEP’T OF THE AIR FORCE, PAMPHLET NO. 110-31, INTERNATIONAL LAW—THE
CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS 5–8 (1976) [hereinafter AIR FORCE
PAMPHLET] (‘‘The requirement to distinguish between combatants and civilians, and
between military objectives and civilian objects, imposes obligations on all the parties to the
conflict to establish and maintain the distinctions.”).
14
AP I, supra note 1, art. 51(2).
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(c) [t]hose which employ a method or means of combat
the effects of which cannot be limited as required by this
Protocol;
and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to
strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects
without distinction.15
Furthermore, Article 85 of Protocol I declares that nearly all
violations of distinction constitute grave breaches of the Protocol,
including:
(a) [m]aking the civilian population or individual
civilians the object of attack;
(b) [l]aunching an indiscriminate attack affecting the
civilian population or civilian objects in the knowledge
that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to
civilians or damage to civilian objects, as defined in
Article 57, paragraph 2 (a)(iii);
....
(d) [m]aking non-defended localities and demilitarized
zones the object of attack; [and]
(e) [m]aking a person the object of attack in the
knowledge that he is hors de combat . . . .16
The Rome Statute similarly criminalizes attacks on civilians and
indiscriminate attacks.17
Finally, the principle of distinction mandates not only differentiation
between civilians and combatants, but between civilian objects and
military objects as well—a critical component of the protection of the
civilian population during armed conflict. Article 52(1) of Additional
Protocol I declares that “[c]ivilian objects shall not be the object of attack
or of reprisals,” and defines civilian objects as “all objects which are not
military objectives.”18 The definition of military objectives in Article 52
of Additional Protocol I demonstrates the framework for distinguishing
between military and civilian objects: “those objects which by their
nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to
military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or

Id. at art. 51(4).
Id. at art. 85.
17
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, arts. 8(2)(b)(i)–(ii), 8(2)(b)(iv)–(vi),
8(2)(e)(i)–(ii), 8(2)(e)(iv), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
18
AP I, supra note 1, art. 52(1).
15
16
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neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite
military advantage.”19
Thus, beyond the obligation to differentiate between innocent
civilians and persons who are fighting (and therefore can be targeted),
the principle of distinction requires comparable determinations
regarding the targeting of objects. The obligation to target only military
objectives is one means of implementing the age-old principle that the
means and methods of warfare are not unlimited.20
The prohibition on attacks against civilian objects is a necessary and
inherent complement to the prohibition on attacks on civilians and the
civilian population. For example, schools and residential areas are
immune from attack unless used for military purposes to the extent that
they qualify as military objectives. The Commentary on the Additional
Protocols explains that many civilian objects are or “can become useful
objects to the armed forces. Thus, for example, a school or a hotel is a
civilian object, but if . . . used to accommodate troops or headquarters
staff, [it will] become [a] military objective[].”21 For example, during
Operation Iraqi Freedom, the United States attacked, among other
buildings, the Baath Party Headquarters, which at first blush appeared
to be a civilian object. Yet, Iraqi forces were firing at U.S. troops from

Id. at art. 52(2).
The modern version of this principle appears in Article 35 of Additional Protocol I;
earlier formulations appear in the writings of Vitoria, Grotius, and Vattel, as well as in
early codifications of the laws of war. St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 10; LAWS OF
WAR ON LAND art. 4 (1880 Oxford Manual) art. 4, available at www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/
140?OpenDocument; LIEBER CODE, supra note 9, art. 16, at 8; 3 HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF
WAR AND PEACE (Francis W. Kelsey trans., Oceana Publ’ns 1964) (1646); EMMERICH DE
VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW (Charles G. Fenwick
trans., Carnegie Institute of Washington 1916) (1785); FRANCISCUS DE VICTORIA, DE INDIS ET
DE IVRE BELLI REFLECTIONES (John Pawley Bate trans., Ocean Publ’ns 1964) (1557).
21
YVES SANDOZ, CHRISTOPHE SWINARSKI, BRUNO ZIMMERMANN, COMMENTARY ON THE
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 ¶
2022 (1987); see CIHL, supra note 11, at 236 (citing AUSTRALIA, DEFENCE FORCE MANUAL
§ 530 (1994)) (“For example, if enemy soldiers use a school building as shelter from attack
by direct fire, then they are clearly gaining a military advantage from the school. This
means the school becomes a military objective and can be attacked.”); id. at 237 (citing
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, NATIONAL DEFENCE OF CANADA, THE LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT AT THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS 4–5 (2001)) (“[W]here a
civilian object is used for military purposes, it loses its protection as a civilian object and
may become a legitimate target.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 238 (citing
NETHERLANDS, MILITARY MANUAL, at V-3 (1993)) (noting civilian buildings can become
military objectives if, for example, they house combatants or are used as commando posts);
see also AIR FORCE PAMPHLET, supra note 13, § 5-3(b)(2) (“The inherent nature of the object is
not controlling since even a traditionally civilian object, such as a civilian house, can be a
military objective when it is occupied and used by military forces during an armed
engagement.”).
19
20
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within and near the building, and a weapons cache was subsequently
found inside the facility.22 This episode shows how actual use is a
critical component to understanding whether a building is a legitimate
target and to distinguishing between military and civilian objects. Even
though the Additional Protocol I emphasizes, importantly, that all
doubts as to the civilian or military nature of an object should be
resolved in favor of civilian status, the actual use of a building must be
taken into account in distinguishing between civilian and military objects
in targeting determinations.
Some objects enjoy additional special protection under LOAC,
including hospitals, religious and cultural property, the environment,
objects indispensable for the civilian population, and works and
installations containing dangerous forces (such as dams or nuclear
power generating stations). Beyond the general protection these
buildings and sites have as civilian objects, they benefit from additional
protections as set forth in Articles 53–56 of Additional Protocol I as a
further means of protecting both the civilian population and its ability to
survive during and after conflict. In particular, the LOAC prohibits the
use of such objects for military purposes. In situations where they are
used for military purposes (in violation of the law) and meet the test for
military objectives, the attacking party is obligated to follow further
precautions and only attack in restricted circumstances.
Several of these categories have recognized protective emblems that
mark objects as deserving of special protection under the law. For
medical and religious objects and personnel, the recognized emblems
are: (1) the Red Cross; (2) the Red Crescent; and (3) the newly-added
Red Crystal.23 Cultural property is marked by a shield, as denoted in the
1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention, and works and installations
containing dangerous forces are marked with three bright orange
circles.24
Through this framework for differentiating between civilians and
fighters, between civilian objects and military objectives, LOAC
transforms the spirit and purpose of the principle of distinction into
Michael N. Schmitt, The Conduct of Hostilities During Operation Iraqi Freedom: An
International Humanitarian Law Assessment, 6 Y.B. INT’L HUM. L. 73 (2003) (citing US
CENTCOM News Release No. 03-03-105, U.S. Marines Destroy Ba’ath Party Headquarters
(Mar. 31, 2003)).
23
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem (Protocol III), Dec. 8, 2005, 2404 U.N.T.S. 1
[hereinafter AP III]. Israel uses the Red Star of David, which is protected as a matter of
practice.
24
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,
arts. 16−17, Apr. 9, 1956, 249 U.N.T.S. 215; AP I, supra note 1, annex I, art. 16.
22
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concrete obligations and protections. And yet, as the following section
highlights, modern conflicts continue to impose extraordinary strain on
distinction and pose grave threats to civilians and civilian protection.
B. Contemporary Challenges for Distinction
In traditional conflicts, one could distinguish between soldiers—who
wore uniforms—and civilians—who typically did not venture near the
battlefield—in most circumstances. Similarly, identifying military and
civilian objects was usually feasible. Contemporary conflicts introduce a
whole new set of challenges in this area, however, demanding evergreater efforts—through intelligence-gathering and surveillance—to
determine who is who in the zone of combat operations. It is precisely
because of the lack of boundaries between conflict areas and civilian
areas—between those who are actively participating in hostilities and
those who are not—that today’s conflicts pose particular challenges for
distinction. In addition, modern warfare is increasingly characterized by
asymmetry in the military capabilities of the parties, which adds to these
challenges. As such asymmetry grows, “the disadvantaged party has an
incentive to blur the distinction between its forces and the civilian
population in the hope that this will deter the other side from attack.”25
Critical to the implementation of distinction in all situations is the
identification of targets—both planned targets and dynamic targets. A
lawful attack must be directed at a legitimate target: either a combatant,
a civilian directly participating in hostilities, or a military object. In
international armed conflicts—those occurring between states—all
members of a state’s regular armed forces are combatants and can be
identified by the uniform they wear, among other characteristics. In
state versus non-state actor conflicts, including counterterrorism
operations within the context of an armed conflict, determining who is a
legitimate target is significantly more complex. The legal obligation
remains the same, however, requiring parties to distinguish between an
innocent civilian and an individual who, although dressed in civilian
attire, may pose an immediate threat, and is therefore a legitimate target.
In addition, a commander must assess whether and when to target
identifiably hostile persons deliberately hiding among the civilian
population.

Michael N. Schmitt, The Impact of High Tech and Low Tech Warfare on Distinction, in
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE 21ST CENTURY’S CONFLICTS: CHANGES AND
CHALLENGES 169, 178 (Roberta Arnold & Pierre-Antoine Hildbrand eds., 2005).
25
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Persons who are members of an organized armed group are
legitimate targets at all times26—but dress the same as civilians either
due to a lack of uniforms or specifically in order to blend into the civilian
population for protection. A second category of legitimate target, as
noted above, is the civilian directly participating in hostilities. The
concept of what constitutes direct participation has been the subject of
extensive analysis and debate and is outside the scope of this Article.27
Nonetheless, regardless of the particular parameters of direct
participation, the essence of the targeting determination in this situation
is the notion that persons directly participating in hostilities—whether
all the time or only once or intermittently—must be distinguished from
innocent civilians. When neither hostile persons nor members of armed
groups wear uniforms or carry their arms openly, differentiating
between legitimate targets and innocent civilians is extraordinarily
difficult and fraught with danger for both the soldier and the innocent
civilian.
U.S. and NATO forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have been wrestling
with the difficult legal and moral questions contemporary conflict raises
for nearly a decade and continue to face complicated questions about
who to target, how to target, and when to target. For example, as one
news article explained about combat in Afghanistan:
The elusive insurgents blend easily into the population,
invisible to Marines until they pick up a weapon. They
use villagers to spot and warn of U.S. troop movements,
take up positions in farmers’ homes and fields, and
attack Marines from spots with ready escape routes.

26
See Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities
Under International Humanitarian Law, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 991 (2008) (adopted by ICRC
Assembly Feb. 26, 2009), http://www.cicr.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/review872−991 [hereinafter Interpretive Guidance] (stating that organized armed groups are
targetable based on status in non-international armed conflict); see also JIMMY GURULÉ &
GEOFFREY S. CORN, PRINCIPLES OF COUNTER-TERRORISM LAW 70−76 (2011) (discussing the
rules governing targeting of enemy forces in international and non-international armed
conflict and noting that (1) “a member of an enemy force . . . is presumed hostile and
therefore presumptively subject to attack” in international armed conflict, and (2)
“[s]ubjecting members of organized belligerent groups to status based targeting pursuant
to the LOAC as opposed to civilians who periodically lose their protection from attack
seems both logical and consistent with the practice of states engaged in non-international
armed conflicts”).
27
Interpretive Guidance, supra note 26; see HCJ 769/02 Public Committee against Torture
in Israel v. Government of Israel (Targeted Killings Case) 57(6) IsrSC [2006]; Forum, The
ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under
International Humanitarian Law, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 637 (2010).
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The Marines, under strict rules to protect civilians,
must wait for insurgents to attack and then attempt to
ensnare them. Limited in their use of airstrikes and
artillery—because of the danger to civilians and because
aircraft often frighten the Taliban away—Marine
riflemen must use themselves as bait and then engage in
the riskier task of pursuing insurgents on foot.28
Similarly, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraqi insurgents
commonly wore civilian clothing when approaching American and
British forces in order to get closer without seeming to present a threat.29
Perhaps most nefariously, insurgent groups that employ suicide
bombing as a tactic have now turned to the use of women and children—
for they have proven more likely to evade measures designed to identify
suicide bombers.30
In all of these situations, the great fluidity between hostile persons
and innocent civilians and the conscious blending of hostile persons into
the civilian population makes the task of identifying legitimate targets
nearly impossible.31 Insurgents take advantage of this dilemma every
day to gain an edge over the superior fighting capabilities of state forces.
In Afghanistan, for example, the Taliban regularly “use a tactic of
engaging coalition forces from positions that expose Afghan civilians to
danger.”32 This tactic is designed to force U.S. troops to either hold their
Ann Scott Tyson, In Afghanistan, a Test of Tactics Under Strict Rules to Protect Civilians,
Marines Face More Complex Missions, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2009, at A6.
29
Id.; see Official: Afghan Militants Fled Dressed as Women, CNN.COM (July 6, 2009),
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/07/06/afghanistan.marine.standoff/index.
html (discussing how insurgents locked in a standoff with U.S. marines disguised
themselves as women in order to escape).
30
See, e.g., Dan Abrams, Turning a Blind Eye to Child Suicide Bombers, MSNBC.COM (Mar.
26, 2004, 11:37 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4601244; Child Bombers-in-Training
Arrested in Iraq, UPI.COM (Apr. 21, 2009, 11:14 AM), http://www.upi.com/Top_News/
2009/04/21/Child-bombers-in-training-arrested-in-Iraq/UPI-48761240326883/; Cassandra
Clifford, The Battle for Suicide Bombers, FOREIGN POL’Y BLOGS NETWORK (Jan. 8, 2010),
http://children.foreignpolicyblogs.com/category/suicide-bombers/; Pakistan:
Taliban
Buying Children for Suicide Attacks, CNN.COM (July 7, 2009), http://edition.cnn.com/2009/
WORLD/asiapcf/07/07/pakistan.child.bombers/index.html (explaining that “young
suicide bombers may be able to reach targets unnoticed”).
31
Laurie R. Blank & Amos N. Guiora, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: Operationalizing
the Law of Armed Conflict in New Warfare, 1 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 45, 65–66 (2010).
32
Jim Garamone, Directive Re-emphasizes Protecting Afghan Civilians, U.S. AIR FORCE (July
6, 2009), http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123157435; see UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION TO AFGHANISTAN, HUMAN RIGHTS UNIT, AFGHANISTAN: MID YEAR
BULLETIN ON PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN ARMED CONFLICT ¶ 35 (2009), available at
http://unama.unmissions.org/portals/unama/human%20rights/09july31-unama-humanrights-civilian-casualties-mid-year-2009-bulletin.pdf (“In several cases investigated by
28
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fire in the face of an attack or endanger innocent civilians—a lose-lose
situation. By not distinguishing themselves from civilians—thus
violating the principle of distinction—these militants deliberately create
such situations. Israel’s conflicts, particularly those with Hezbollah in
Lebanon in 2006 and with Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups in
Gaza from December 2008 through January 2009, offer an equally searing
commentary about the nature of asymmetrical war. Indeed, in the Gaza
Strip, “one of the most densely populated tracts of land in the world,”33
where militants intermingle with the civilian population, store munitions
in residential buildings, hospitals, and mosques, and launch rockets from
farmers’ fields and residential rooftops, the implementation of LOAC
faces one of its gravest tests. Faced with Hamas militants firing from
schools, storing munitions in mosques, and using hospitals as command
posts, Israeli troops encounter many of the same challenging decisions as
U.S. troops in Afghanistan.
In all of these situations, the failure of some groups and/or
individuals—whether state or non-state actors—to distinguish
themselves from civilians creates ever-greater dangers for the civilian
population caught in the conflict zone. The purposeful mixing with
civilians and use of the civilian population as a shield only exacerbates
these dangers. For this reason, it is essential to focus not only on the
need to implement distinction in targeting as effectively as possible, but
also to enforce accountability for violations of distinction in conduct.
III. IMPLEMENTING DISTINCTION IN TARGETING AND IN CONDUCT
Legal obligations in targeting receive significant attention during
dissemination, training, decision-making, and post-hoc accountability.
There is little doubt that training troops—whether fighter pilots,
infantrymen, or artillery units—in how to carry out the legal obligation
to distinguish between legitimate targets and innocent civilians
protected from attack is central to the lawful conduct of hostilities.
Accountability for violations of these obligations is equally important,
and has been a key focus of the international and hybrid tribunals over

[United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan], it is apparent that important
traditional codes of hospitality and power imbalances inhibit the ability of villagers living
in areas with a strong [anti-government element] presence to refuse shelter to an [antigovernment element] commander or his men. Information indicates that [anti-government
elements] take advantage of these factors to use civilian houses as cover, to deter [progovernment force] raids, or to increase the likelihood of civilian casualties if raided by [progovernment forces], potentially violating international humanitarian law.”).
33
Key Maps, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/
v3_israel_palestinians/maps/html/population_settlements.stm (last visited Mar. 29, 2012).
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the past decade or longer. But these efforts only tell part of the story and
tackle part of the problem. Fighters who launch attacks in civilian
clothing, from protected civilian sites, and use civilians as shields are
violating LOAC and must be held accountable for their conduct. Until
then, distinction will only be enforced halfway.
A. Operationalizing Distinction
On the battlefield, the critical determination is between those who
can be attacked and those who cannot. Combatant status does provide
one lens for making this determination: All members of the opposing
armed forces are legitimate targets of attack at all times. Other
individuals, such as members of militia groups and civilians directly
participating in hostilities, are legitimate targets but are significantly
harder to identify. Operationalizing distinction in the zone of combat
thus requires extensive training and the use of intelligence to help
understand who is an innocent civilian deserving of protection and who
is a hostile actor posing a legitimate threat.
In practice, military forces implement distinction through rules of
engagement (“ROE”) that set forth the parameters for the use of force
during armed conflict. ROE are “[d]irectives issued by competent
military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under
which [U.S.] forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement
with other forces encountered.”34 In most conflicts between states or
readily identifiable armed groups, the ROE will declare the enemy force
hostile, meaning that any member of such force is a legitimate target.35
Thus, Iraqi military forces and certain paramilitary groups were declared
hostile for Operation Iraqi Freedom.36 ROE for Operation Iraqi Freedom
designated the following “groups and organizations . . . as paramilitary
forces that may be considered hostile and engaged” and destroyed:
Special Republican Guard, Ba’ath Party Militia, Fedayeen Sadaam, Al
DEP’T OF DEFENSE, JOINT PUBL’N 1-02, DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED
TERMS
(2010),
as
amended
through
15
February
2012,
available
at
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf; see INT’L & OPERATIONAL LAW
DEP’T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER & SCHOOL, JA-422, OPERATIONAL
LAW HANDBOOK 73 (2010) [hereinafter OP LAW HANDBOOK].
35
See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01A, Standing Rules of
Engagement (SROE) for U.S. Forces (2000) Enclosure A, 6 [hereinafter SROE] (“Once a force
is declared hostile by appropriate authority, US units need not observe a hostile act or a
demonstration of hostile intent before engaging that force.”).
36
CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL
CENTER & SCHOOL, LEGAL LESSONS LEARNED FROM AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: VOLUME I,
MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS (11 SEPTEMBER 2001 TO 1 MAY 2003), at 98 (2004) [hereinafter
CLAMO], available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/clamo-v1.pdf.
34
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Quds, and others.37 Identifying who fell into these groups was then the
key issue for determining who was a legitimate target.
In contrast, in Afghanistan, the ROE for Operation Enduring
Freedom did not declare any forces hostile by status. One reason was
simply the challenge in defining the contours of the enemy groups:
First, it was difficult to determine who exactly was a
hostile force in Afghanistan. The Taliban was an
amorphously defined group comprised of the Taliban
regime itself as well as their armed units, various
members of which were not committed to any cause and
willingly switched allegiances. Al Qaeda members
similarly were difficult to define.38
Second, status-based targeting did not fit as well with the
counterinsurgency goals of the mission. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, as
in all military operations, the ROE provided for the use of deadly force in
self-defense in response to a hostile act or exhibited hostile intent, as set
forth in the U.S. Standing Rules of Engagement (“SROE”), which is the
ROE for all military operations short of declared war or prolonged
conflict.39
In conflicts where status-based targeting gives way to conduct-based
targeting due to the inherent difficulties of differentiating among
persons in the zone of combat, the concepts of hostile act and hostile
intent demonstrate how distinction is operationalized in practice. As one
Marine Staff Judge Advocate explained in an After Action Report:
“‘What does a Taliban or Al Qa[e]da fighter look like? Can you
determine the enemy’s identity by the equipment they use? These and
other questions were often unanswerable, even when based on the most
current intelligence available.’”40 As a result, the conduct analysis
inherent in hostile act and hostile intent prove to be the predominant
method of identifying hostile persons in Afghanistan and other combat

ANNEX E (CONSOLIDATED ROE) TO 3-187 FRAGO 02, OPORD 02-005,
http://www.expose-the-war-profiteers.org/archive/government/2005/20050000.pdf
[hereinafter IRAQ ROE].
38
CLAMO, supra note 36, at 101.
39
SROE, supra note 35, Enclosure A, 1(c)(1). See generally CLAMO, supra note 36 (noting
that the ROE include authorization for the use of force in self-defense); IRAQ ROE, supra
note 37, at 3.A.(2)–(3) (stating that commanders have inherent authority and an obligation
to respond in self-defense to hostile acts or demonstrations of hostile intent).
40
CLAMO, supra note 36, at 98 (citing Major Ian D. Brasure, Staff Judge Advocate, 26th
Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable), After Action Report: Operation
Enduring Freedom/Operation Swift Freedom ¶ (3)(b) (Mar. 22, 2002)).
37
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areas where fighters look like civilians and the two are mingled together
in civilian areas.
The SROE define “[h]ostile [a]ct” as:
An attack or other use of force against the United States,
US forces, and, in certain circumstances, US nationals,
their property, US commercial assets, and/or other
designated non-US forces, foreign nationals and their
property. It is also force used directly to preclude or
impede the mission and/or duties of US forces,
including the recovery of US personnel and vital US
Government property . . . .41
The ROE for Operation Iraqi Freedom offer several examples of hostile
acts, including: “releasing, launching, or firing missiles, guns, rockets,
directed-energy weapons or any other weapons against US Forces;
laying mines; attacking or taking control of information systems critical
to military employment or national infrastructure.”42 Hostile intent is
defined as the threat of imminent use of force against the same interests
listed in the definition of hostile act above. External factors such as “the
state of international or regional political tension, military preparations,
intelligence, and indication and warning information” will all play a role
in determining the existence of hostile intent.43
Evidence of hostile intent is considered to exist when a
foreign force or terrorist(s): is detected to maneuver into
a weapon launch position; is preparing to fire, launch or
release weapons against the US, US Forces, and in
certain circumstances, US nationals and their property,
or US commercial assets; is preparing to lay mines; or
attempts to gain control of information systems critical
to military employment or national infrastructure.44
Finally, the ROE for Operation Enduring Freedom (“OEF ROE”) in
Afghanistan added a new component to the determination of legitimate
targets—and thus to the process of discrimination between such targets
and innocent civilians protected from attack. OEF ROE added the
criterion of “likely and identifiable threat” (“LIT”): “[C]ertain enemy
forces who posed a likely and identifiable threat to friendly forces could
41
42
43
44
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SROE, supra note 35, at 5(g).
IRAQ ROE, supra note 37, at 3.H.(6).
Id. at 3.H.(7).
Id.
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be considered hostile and engaged and destroyed.”45 The idea was to
allow the U.S. military and allied forces to target potential threats that
could arise during the conduct of military operations—in addition to
actual or imminent threats—thus creating a middle ground between a
declaration of hostile force and a self-defense based authorization of the
use of force.
During the course of operations, therefore, militaries have a range of
tools for implementing distinction to comport with their obligations
under LOAC. The nature of contemporary conflicts and the tactics of
militants make this task exponentially harder. As a result, effective
military operations will continually demand additional efforts and new
tools for operationalizing distinction and other LOAC principles, so as to
maximize protection of innocent civilians while still enabling mission
fulfillment.46
B. Enforcing Distinction: Accountability for Attacks on Civilians
The prohibition on attacks against civilians is the most fundamental
component of distinction. As the Commentary to Additional Protocol I
explains, the prohibition in Article 51 “explicitly confirms the customary
rule that innocent civilians must be kept outside hostilities as far as
possible and enjoy general protection against danger arising from
hostilities.”47 Unlawful attacks on civilians include both deliberate and
indiscriminate attacks.
For example, the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court criminalizes both types of attacks:
intentional attacks directed against civilians and attacks made in the
knowledge that civilian casualties would be clearly excessive in relation
to the military advantage gained—that is, attacks that violate the
principle of proportionality.48
CLAMO, supra note 36, at 100.
See Blank & Guiora, supra note 31 (setting out a framework for operationalizing LOAC
in response to the challenges of contemporary conflicts).
47
SANDOZ ET AL., supra note 21, at 615.
48
Rome Statute, supra note 17, art. 8. Defining “‘war crimes’” as:
(b) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in
international armed conflict, within the established framework of
international law, namely, any of the following acts:
(i) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population
as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in
hostilities;
...
(iv) Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such
attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage
to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the
natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to
45
46

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 3 [2012], Art. 3

782

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

The ICTY has extensive jurisprudence on the prosecution of
deliberate and indiscriminate attacks on civilians and has consistently
reinforced “that there is an absolute prohibition on the targeting of
civilians in customary international law.”49 In particular, the ICTY has
repeatedly reaffirmed “that a violation of the principle prohibiting
attacks on civilians entails individual criminal responsibility.”50 The
elements of the crime of unlawful attacks on civilians and civilian
property track the obligations of distinction. As the ICTY held in
Prosecutor v. Galic, the crime of attacks on civilians consists of the
following elements:
1.
Acts of violence directed against the civilian
population or individual civilians not taking direct part
in hostilities causing death or serious injury to body or
health within the civilian population.
2.
The offender wilfully [sic] made the civilian
population or individual civilians not taking direct part
in hostilities the object of those acts of violence.51
In Galic, the Bosnian Serb army laid siege to Sarajevo and engaged in
a protracted campaign of sniping and shelling the civilian population
over the course of three years. Certainly, deliberate attacks on civilians
violate the principle of distinction.
Indiscriminate attacks and
disproportionate attacks on civilians do so as well because, in such cases,
the perpetrator willfully or recklessly disregards the presence of civilians
when launching an attack. The ICTY thus emphasized, in Prosecutor v.
Kupreskic, “the sacrosanct character of the duty to protect civilians”—
even when interspersed in a city or town with combatants or other
armed elements.52
National courts, national criminal codes, and military manuals also
criminalize attacks on civilians. Perhaps the most emphatic statement of
the prohibition on attacks against civilians and the universality of that
norm appears in the court-martial of Lieutenant William Calley after the
My Lai massacre during the Vietnam War. Finding Lieutenant Calley
the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.
Id.
49
Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 109 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004).
50
Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, ¶ 29 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003); Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-AR72, Decision
on Interlocutory Appeal, ¶ 10 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 22, 2002).
51
Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, ¶ 56.
52
Prosecutor v. Kuprei, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 513 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2002).
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guilty of the murder of innocent men, women, and children, the U.S.
Court of Military Appeals stated that “kill[ing] infants and unarmed
civilians who were so demonstrably incapable of resistance to the armed
might of a military force . . . is . . . palpably illegal.”53 Countries around
the world have incorporated the war crime of attacks on civilians into
their penal codes and codes of military justice.54 In military manuals and
military training, protection of civilians from attack is often the first rule.
Thus, “‘The Soldier’s Rules’” start with the phrase “[s]oldiers fight only
enemy combatants,” a direct incorporation of the prohibition on attacks
against civilians into military training and teaching.55 The United
Kingdom Manual on the Law of Armed Conflict details extensively the
categories of war crimes, including attacks on civilians and other
violations of distinction in targeting, and the nature of individual
criminal responsibility for war crimes.56

53
54

United States v. Calley, 22 C.M.A. 534, 544 (Dec. 21, 1973).
See Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, ¶ 31, n.47, citing the following statutes:
Law of 16 June 1993 relative to the repression of serious violations of
international humanitarian law, Belgium, Chapter 1§ 3, No.11;
Swedish Penal Code, Chap. 22, § 6, No. 3 and 4 (1990); Hungarian
Criminal Code, Chapter XI, Section 160 (1978); Philippine Criminal
Code, Article 334 (1964); Criminal Code of Mozambique, Article 83
(1987); Italian Criminal Military Code of War, Article 185 (1941);
Spanish Penal Code, Article 611 (1) (1995); Croatian Penal Code,
Article 120 (1) (1991).

Id.
55
DEP’T OF THE ARMY, AR 350-1, ARMY TRAINING AND LEADER DEVELOPMENT ¶ G-12(b)
(2009).
56
UK LAW OF WAR MANUAL, CH. 16, § G. Many other national military manuals do as
well, as the ICTY Trial Chamber noted in the Galic judgment. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T,
Judgment, ¶ 31, n.50, citing the following:
United States Field Manual No. 27-10: The Law of Land Warfare, para.
25 (1976); United Kingdom Manual of Military Law, chap. 4, para. 88
(1958); German Military Manual (Humanitäres Völkrerrecht in
bewaffnetenKonflikten-Handbuch), paras 404 and 451 (1992) (English
translation available at ICTY library); Canadian Law of Armed Conflict
at the Operational and Tactical Level, Section 4, paras 15 and 22 (1992);
Dutch “Soldiers Handbook” (Handboek voor de Soldaat), VS 2-1350,
Chapter VII, Art. 34 (1974); Australian Law of Armed Conflict
Commander’s Guide (ADFP 37 Supplement 1), para. 1302 (1994); New
Zealand Interim Law of Armed Conflict Manual, para. 517 (1992);
Canadian Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical
Level, Section 4, paras 15, 22 (1992); Soviet Minister of Defence Order
No. 75 of 16 February 1990 on the Publication of the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 relative to the Protection of Victims of
War and their Additional Protocols (1990), art. 8, para. (f) (French
translation available at the ICRC’s web site: <http://www.icrc.org>.).
Id.
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All of these tools for criminalizing attacks on civilians and ensuring
individual criminal responsibility for such attacks play a critical role in
the implementation and enforcement of the obligations of the principle
of distinction. Individuals who disregard this fundamental obligation
and target civilians—whether deliberately or indiscriminately—can face
criminal prosecution and individual accountability for their actions.
Unfortunately, direct targeting of civilians remains far too prevalent in
today’s conflicts, but these efforts at individual accountability continue
to make inroads into the protection of civilians and the punishment of
those who fail to adhere to these standards. Without more, however, as
detailed below, these efforts at operationalizing and accountability are
only half the battle.
C. Enforcing Distinction in the Conduct of Fighters
The tragically all-too-common practices of fighters disguising
themselves as civilians, launching attacks from and locating military
objectives in civilian areas, and using civilians as human shields raise
grave concerns for the implementation of LOAC. These tactics violate
LOAC and also increase the danger that civilians face during armed
conflict. Still worse, in many contemporary conflicts, militants or weaker
states fighting against more powerful states use these tactics to achieve
broader strategic purposes by increasing civilian casualties—such as
diminished civilian support for the war effort, claims of war crimes by
the stronger military, or strategic and policy limitations on the use of
force that impact the outcome of the conflict. Enforcing the obligations
of distinction at the tactical level of the conduct of militants and fighters
thus goes well beyond the protection of civilians in the immediate
vicinity of and affected by a particular incident—it can have substantial
consequences for the protection of civilians writ large during conflict.
And yet, as the discussion below demonstrates, little to no effort is made
to hold fighters accountable—or even to condemn their failure to
distinguish themselves from innocent civilians and for their use of the
civilian population for their own gain in direct contravention of LOAC’s
fundamental principles.
1.

Perfidious Attacks

News stories from Afghanistan, Gaza, Lebanon, Colombia, and a
number of other conflict areas repeatedly tell of persons fighting in
civilian clothes. Indeed, this characteristic of contemporary conflict
presents perhaps the greatest challenge to LOAC-compliant militaries: If
a soldier cannot tell who is an innocent civilian and who is a hostile
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person, distinguishing and identifying legitimate targets is an
extraordinarily complex and difficult task. But it remains essential to the
lawful conduct of military operations.
Simply fighting in civilian clothing or without a formal uniform is
not in and of itself a violation of LOAC. Civilians who take part in
hostilities do not run afoul of the law just by picking up a gun or firing a
rocket. Rather, the immediate consequence of civilian participation in
hostilities is that such persons lose their immunity from attack and
become lawful targets of attack.57 When individuals deliberately use the
appearance of protected status in order to launch an attack, however,
they violate the law.
In many cases across a range of conflicts, fighters specifically exploit
the protections LOAC grants to civilians in order to gain an advantage in
attacking the state party or the more powerful party in the conflict. The
traditional definition of perfidy is “[t]o kill or wound treacherously
individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army,” as set forth in
Suicide bombers
Article 23(b) of the 1907 Hague Convention.58
disguising themselves as civilians to gain closer access to military
checkpoints or other locations is a prime example of killing
“treacherously.” Article 37(1) of Additional Protocol I offers a more
comprehensive formulation, forbidding killing, capturing, or injuring the
enemy “by resort to perfidy.”59 In particular, the Protocol states that
“[a]cts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that
he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of
international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that
confidence, shall constitute perfidy.”60 Based on notions of honor, this
prohibition unquestionably forms part of customary international law.61
See AP I, supra note 1, art. 51(3).
Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex:
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 23(b), Oct. 18, 1907, 36
Stat. 2277, T.S. 539 [hereinafter Hague IV]. The prohibition of killing treacherously goes
back to the Lieber Code, which states that military necessity “admits of deception, but
disclaims acts of perfidy.” LIEBER CODE, supra note 9, art. 16, at 8.
59
AP I, supra note 1, art. 37(1). Examples of perfidy in Article 37(1)(a)–(d) include
feigning truce or surrender, feigning civilian status, or feigning protected status by using
emblems of the U.N. or neutral states.
60
Id. (emphasis added).
61
YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICT 199 (2004); Michael N. Schmitt, Asymmetrical Warfare and International
Humanitarian Law, 62 A.F. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (2008) (citing NWP 1-14M, ¶ 12.7); see INT’L &
OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER & SCHOOL, JA423, LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK 192 (Keith E. Puls ed., 2005), available at
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/law-war-handbook-2005.pdf; SAN REMO
MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA Rule 111 (June
12, 1994); see also CIHL, supra note 11, Rule 65 (stating that the prohibition on perfidy is a
57
58
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As the Commentary to the Additional Protocols explains, “[t]he
central element of the definition of perfidy is the deliberate claim to legal
protection for hostile purposes. The enemy attacks under cover of the
protection accorded by humanitarian law . . . .”62 Thus, when fighters
intentionally disguise themselves as civilians to lead soldiers on the
opposing side to believe that they need not take defensive action to
guard against attack, they commit perfidy. It is important to distinguish
such perfidious attacks from legitimate ruses of war, which also involve
deception, but do not violate LOAC.
Ruses are legitimate tools of warfare; the Lieber Code states that
“deception in war is admitted as a just and necessary means of
hostility . . . consistent with honorable warfare . . . .”63 The key difference
between a ruse and perfidy is that the latter must involve a deliberate
attempt to benefit from the protections of LOAC by inducing the other
side to believe that one is protected under LOAC. Examples of ruses
include: (1) camouflaging a tank so that the enemy does not see it; (2)
using disinformation to lead the enemy to believe that the attack will
take place at a different time or a different place; or (3) faking
communications to suggest the presence of multiple units or a larger
force. Thus, it is not the act of hiding from the enemy or making oneself
less noticeable that is the essence of perfidy, but the use of what appears
to be protected status. “A soldier may attempt to become invisible in the
landscape [by wearing a camouflage uniform], but not in a crowd [by
pretending to be a civilian].”64 The indirect consequence of such actions
is that civilians are placed at greater risk, since soldiers previously
attacked by fighters disguised as civilians may be more likely to view
those who appear to be civilians as dangerous and respond accordingly.
Past and present conflicts offer numerous examples of perfidious
conduct. Suicide bombing—a classic example of perfidy, as noted
above—is a regular tactic of numerous terrorist and insurgent groups in
conflicts from Sri Lanka to Gaza to Pakistan. The Tamil Tigers in Sri
Lanka, formally known as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(“LTTE”), are the “fathers of modern-day suicide bombing,” and they

long-standing rule of customary international law in both international and noninternational armed conflicts).
62
SANDOZ, supra note 21, at 435 (footnote omitted) (“The definition is based on three
elements: inviting the confidence of an adversary, the intent to betray that confidence
(subjective element) and to betray it on a specific point, the existence of the protection
afforded by international law applicable in armed conflict (objective element).”).
63
LIEBER CODE, supra note 9, art. 101, at 31.
64
GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
IN WAR 423 (2010).
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accounted for one-third of all suicide bombings in the world in 2002.65 In
most such attacks, the suicide bomber dresses as a civilian to gain better
access to the target, such as a checkpoint or government building. For
example, in February 2009, a female insurgent dressed as a civilian blew
herself up at a government checkpoint for civilians fleeing the conflict
zone, killing twenty-eight people and wounding dozens of others.66
After the conflict ended in May 2009, the United Nations (“U.N.”)
Secretary General appointed a Panel of Experts to examine “the
accountability obligations arising from the last stages of the war” and to
assess “the ‘nature and scope of alleged violations.’”67 Among the
hundred-plus pages of violations that the Panel details, it addresses a
wide variety of violations of LOAC and human rights law, including the
killing of civilians through suicide attacks. After referring to “[c]redible
allegations” of “a number of suicide attacks, both in and outside of the
conflict zone, against civilians[,] . . . [t]he Panel notes that these attacks
constitute a clear violation of the ban on intentional or indiscriminate
attacks on civilians.”68 However, notwithstanding the fact that these
suicide attacks also constitute perfidy—a violation of LOAC codified as
far back as the Lieber Code—the Panel’s report does not even mention
perfidy or the fact that the perpetrators of these suicide attacks are
violating their obligations under the principle of distinction, with severe
consequences for civilian protections.69
One of the more widely reported and catastrophic examples of
perfidy took place in Srebrenica in the summer of 1995. As the Bosnian
Serbs overran the U.N.’s safe haven of Srebrenica, thousands of Bosnian
Muslims fled the city, seeking safety elsewhere. As a long column of
Bosnian Muslim men—who had been forcibly separated from their
families—tried to reach Bosnian government territory and safety, they
faced repeated attacks by Bosnian Serb forces. Eventually, “Bosnian Serb
soldiers wearing stolen UN uniforms and driving stolen U.N. vehicles
announced over megaphones [that they were U.N. peacekeepers and
that they were] prepared to oversee the Bosnian Muslims’ surrender and

65
Alex Perry, How Sri Lanka’s Rebels Build a Suicide Bomber, TIME (May 12, 2006),
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1193862,00.html.
66
More Civilians Killed in Sri Lanka Fighting, AMNESTY INT’L (Feb. 10, 2009),
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/more-civilians-killed-sri-lankafighting-20090210.
67
U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL’S PANEL OF EXPERTS
ON ACCOUNTABILITY IN SRI LANKA i (Mar. 31, 2004) [hereinafter SRI LANKA REPORT].
68
Id. at 66.
69
LIEBER CODE, supra note 9, at art. 16 (stating that military necessity “admits of
deception, but disclaims acts of perfidy”).
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guarantee they would not be harmed.”70 The Bosnian Muslim men
surrendered; shortly thereafter, the Bosnian Serb forces killed all of them
and buried them in mass graves.71
The Bosnian Serbs’ conduct is a textbook example of perfidy: They
used the stolen U.N. uniforms and vehicles to gain the Bosnian Muslims’
confidence, induce their surrender, and then kill them. None of the
judgments of the ICTY involving crimes at Srebrenica discuss the
violation of perfidy or directly condemn the Bosnian Serbs’ use of U.N.
uniforms and vehicles to gain the confidence of the Bosnian Muslim men
before killing them. The crimes of genocide and crimes against
humanity for which the perpetrators were held accountable are certainly
far more heinous and far graver than perfidy, and the Tribunal’s focus
was to prosecute the most serious crimes stemming from the war in the
former Yugoslavia, making the omission of perfidy significantly less
important than it otherwise might have been.
Nonetheless, a
condemnation or even a recognition of the violation would contribute to
the enforcement of accountability for this and other similar violations of
distinction.
During Operation Cast Lead, the Israeli military operation in the
Gaza Strip from December 2008 to January 2009, Palestinian armed
groups generally operated in civilian clothing and from civilian areas,
enabling them to take advantage of the protections that LOAC affords
civilians. However, the Report of the U.N. Fact-Finding Mission on the
Gaza Conflict (“Goldstone Report”), which investigated allegations of
violations during the conflict, does not even mention perfidy in
discussing the activities of Hamas and other armed groups, instead
completely ignoring the true nature of their practices. The Goldstone
David Rohde, Perfidy and Treachery, CRIMES OF WAR, http://www.crimesofwar.org/azguide/perfidy-and-treachery/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2012); see THE COMMISSION FOR
INVESTIGATION OF THE EVENTS IN AND AROUND SREBRENICA 10TH AND 19TH JULY 1995, THE
EVENTS IN AND AROUND SREBRENICA BETWEEN 10TH AND 19TH JULY 1995, at 15 (2004),
available at http://trial-ch.org/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/trialwatch/Srebrenica_
Report2004.pdf [hereinafter MASSACRE AT SREBRENICA]; see also Prosecutor v. Karadzic &
Mladic, Initial Indictment, IT-95-18-I, ¶ 19 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov.
14, 1995) [hereinafter Karadzic & Mladic Indictment] (“In many instances, assurances of
safety were provided to the Muslims by Bosnian Serb military personnel who were with
other Bosnian Serb soldiers wearing stolen UN uniforms . . .”); SOLIS, supra note 64, at 431
(describing how the Bosnian Serb soldiers wore U.N. uniforms to convince the Bosnian
Muslims that they would be safe if they surrendered).
71
Karadzic & Mladic Indictment, supra note 70, ¶¶ 19–20; MASSACRE AT SREBRENICA,
supra note 70; John Grimond, Nowhere to Hide: How Bosnian Serbs Executed 7,000 Muslims
Under the Eyes of the U.N. and the World, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1997,
http://www.nytimes.com/books/97/05/11/reviews/970511.11grimont.html (reviewing
DAVID ROHDE, ENDGAME: THE BETRAYAL AND FALL OF SREBRENICA, EUROPE’S WORST
MASSACRE SINCE WORLD WAR II (1997)).
70
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Report recognizes that Palestinian armed groups fired rockets and
mortars from urban areas, citing, for example, a January 2009 interview
with three Palestinian militants in which they “stated that rockets and
mortars were launched in close proximity to homes and alleyways in the
hope that nearby civilians would deter Israel from responding.”72
Similarly, the Goldstone Report also notes that members of Palestinian
armed groups did not wear uniforms. Instead, after “the start of the
military operations, members of al-Qassam Brigades abandoned military
dress and patrolled streets in civilian clothes.”73 Notwithstanding these
preliminary statements, however, the Goldstone Report does not even
address the question of intent to deceive through the use of civilian
clothes. “Palestinian militants were not just shielding the mortars from
attack, but were attacking—firing mortars and rockets—while in civilian
dress and while feigning civilian status—the fundamental element of
perfidy.”74 The failure to address the practice of militants attacking
while disguised as civilians essentially encourages militants to embed
themselves within the civilian population. After all, the Goldstone
Report describes these exact tactics without identifying or condemning
the LOAC violation at issue, effectively encouraging such tactics.
When international prosecutions or investigations into LOAC
violations disregard perfidious tactics—whether inadvertently,
deliberately, or, more justifiably, in favor of more serious crimes—the
effect is to ratify such tactics. The absence of condemnation and
accountability speaks volumes: Perfidy becomes an accepted practice.
For example:
If a guerrilla movement were systematically to take
advantage of the surprise element that lies in attacking
while posing as civilians until—as one expert said “a
split second before the attack”—it would inevitably
undermine the presumption, which is vital to maintain,
namely that apparently unarmed persons in civilian
U.N. Human Rights Council, Human Rights In Palestine And Other Occupied Arab
Territories: Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, ¶¶ 450–51,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48 (Sept. 15, 2009) [hereinafter Goldstone Report] (internal
quotation marks omitted).
73
Id. ¶ 478 (internal quotation marks omitted).
74
Laurie R. Blank, Finding Facts but Missing the Law: The Goldstone Report, Gaza and
Lawfare, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 280, 291 (2010) (citing Int’l Humanitarian Law Research
Initiative, Legal Aspects of Suicide Attacks in IHL, in MONITORING INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN IRAQ). “However, the fact that the attackers in recent suicide
operations have posed as civilians and therefore concealed their combatant status
constitutes an act of perfidy prohibited under IHL.” Int’l Humanitarian Law Research
Initiative, supra.
72
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dress, do not attack. The result of undermining or
eliminating this presumption is bound to have dreadful
consequences for the civilian population.75
The true victims of this failure of enforcement and accountability are
the innocent civilians: (1) they are trapped—literally and figuratively—
in the conflict zone by fighters using them as cover for their perfidious
tactics; and (2) they become the unintentional and tragic targets of
soldiers who mistake them for legitimate targets when unable to
distinguish between fighters and civilians.
2.

Hiding Military Objectives in the Civilian Population

The obligation to distinguish is not limited to individuals, but
governs the use of objects as well. Recent conflicts in particular have
involved extensive co-mingling of civilian and military objects, which
poses a grave danger to civilians. Insurgents and other fighters in
Afghanistan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Gaza, for example, make extensive use
of civilian infrastructure to hide, store, and launch rockets, missiles, and
other weapons. In Afghanistan, Taliban militants have stored heavy
weaponry in mosques and reportedly positioned two large anti-aircraft
guns in front of the office of a major international humanitarian aid
organization.76 Such conduct makes targeting decisions extraordinarily
difficult given the obligations to minimize civilian casualties and operate
within the framework of proportionality. It also creates situations where
a LOAC-compliant military often appears forced to choose between
engaging a legitimate target and endangering civilians. “By shifting
soldiers and military equipment into civilian neighborhoods and taking
refuge in mosques, archeological sites and other nonmilitary facilities,
Taliban forces [confront] U.S. authorities with the choice of risking
civilian casualties and destruction of treasured Afghan assets or forgoing
attacks.”77
These practices highlight the obligation of precautions—an essential
component of how parties implement LOAC’s central purpose of
75
MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 254 (1982); see
Derek Jinks, Protective Parity and the Laws of War, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1493, 1497 (2004)
(“[T]he goal of protecting innocent civilians . . . requires a sharp line between combatants
and non-combatants.”).
76
See, e.g., Mark Mazzetti & Kevin Whitelaw, Into the Thick of Things, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Nov. 5, 2001 (“Heavy weaponry is being sheltered in several mosques to deter
attacks. The Taliban has even placed a tank and two large antiaircraft guns under trees in
front of the office of CARE International . . . .”).
77
Bradley Graham & Vernon Loeb, Taliban Dispersal Slows U.S., WASH. POST, Nov. 6,
2001, at 1.
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protection of civilians during armed conflict. In many ways, the
identification of military objectives and the proportionality
considerations are, of course, precautions. But the obligations of the
parties to a conflict to take precautionary measures go beyond that.
Beginning at the broadest level, Article 57(1) of Additional Protocol I
states: “In the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be
taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.”78
This provision is a direct outgrowth of, and supplement to, the Basic
Rule in Article 48, which mandates that all parties distinguish between
combatants and civilians and between military objects and civilian
objects. Although the obligation to take constant care is a general
principle, it has important ramifications for the conduct of hostilities and
the protection of civilians: “It is quite clear that by respecting this
obligation the Parties to the conflict will spare the civilian population,
civilians and civilian objects.”79 Moreover, the obligations to take
precautions are “not simply [comprised of] hortatory norms encouraging
good practice. They constitute obligatory standards of conduct whose
violation would entail international responsibility.”80
Most jurisprudence, news analyses, and legal commentary have
focused on the attacking party’s obligation to take precautions in
identifying targets and launching attacks. Article 57 of Additional
Protocol I sets forth precautions that attacking parties must take. First,
parties must refrain from launching attacks that violate the principle of
proportionality, as detailed above. Parties also must do everything
feasible to ensure that targets are military objectives, and must choose
the means and methods of attack with the aim of minimizing incidental
civilian losses and damage. When choosing between two possible
attacks offering similar military advantages, parties must choose the
objective that offers the least likely amount of harm to civilians and
civilian objects. Finally, the attacking party must, where feasible, give
effective advance warning of attacks. Failure to take the necessary
precautions can render an attack unlawful, even if launched against a
legitimate target. For example, the European Court of Human Rights
strongly criticized a Russian operation in a Chechen village for the
failure to take any precautions for the protection of civilians in the
planning or execution of the operation. Although the attack may have
been against a legitimate target—insurgents entrenched in the village—it
was unlawful because the court found no evidence “that it was planned
AP I, supra note 1, art. 57(1).
SANDOZ, supra note 21, at 680.
80
Jean-Francois Quéguiner, Precautions Under the Law Governing the Conduct of Hostilities,
88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 793, 794 (2006).
78
79
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and executed with the requisite care for the lives of the civilian
population.”81
However, importantly, Article 57’s emphasis on the attacking party’s
obligations does not in any way diminish the defending party’s
obligations.82 Instead, the obligation to take precautions extends to the
defending party as well. Article 58, entitled “Precautions against the
effects of attacks,” requires parties to:
(a) . . . endeavour to remove the civilian population,
individual civilians and civilian objects under their
control from the vicinity of military objectives;
(b) [a]void locating military objectives within or near
densely populated areas; [and]
(c) [t]ake the other necessary precautions to protect the
civilian population, individual civilians and civilian
objects under their control against the dangers resulting
from military operations.83
As the Commentary to Additional Protocol I explains, “[b]elligerents
may expect their adversaries to conduct themselves [lawfully] . . . and to
respect the civilian population, but they themselves must also cooperate
by taking all possible precautions for the benefit of their own population
as is in any case in their own interest.”84 Parties therefore have an
obligation to protect their own civilians from the consequences of their
own offensive actions as well as those of the enemy. Article 58, which
expands on pre-existing norms, is considered customary international
law.85
Although all three obligations in Article 58 play a critical role in
protecting the civilian population from the dangers of armed hostilities,
81
Isayeva v. Russia, App. No. 57950/00, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 847, ¶ 200 (2005); see Prosecutor
v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 524 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000); Ethiopia v. Eritrea, 26 R.I.A.A. 1, ¶ 33 (Eth.-Eri. Claims Comm’n
2005), available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_XXVI/1-22.pdf; Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to
Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, ¶ 88 (2000),
reprinted in 39 I.L.M. 1257 (2000), available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/OTP/
otp_report_nato_bombing_en.pdf.
82
Although the obligation to take “constant care” appears in Article 57, which addresses
the attacking party, the Commentary suggests that both parties have such an obligation:
“The term ‘military operations’ should be understood to mean any movements,
manoeuvres and other activities whatsoever carried out by the armed forces with a view to
combat.” SANDOZ, supra note 21, at 680.
83
AP I, supra note 1, art. 58.
84
SANDOZ, supra note 21, at 692.
85
See, e.g., Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 524.
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the obligation to refrain from locating military objectives in densely
populated areas is particularly relevant in today’s conflicts. A Human
Rights Watch report on Schools and Armed Conflict highlights these
dangers. Although many of the incidents detailed therein involve the
occupation of schools for headquarters or barracks for soldiers or
militants, in addition to the positioning of military objectives in schools,
the dangers for the civilian population are the same. As one mother in
Thailand explained after removing her children from a school occupied
by paramilitary forces for two years: “[W]hen they moved into the
school, I feared there would be an attack on the school, so that is the
reason I withdrew my children[;] . . . if there was an attack on the
grounds, the children would be hit as well.”86 In the same vein, the
United States listed several examples in denouncing Iraqi mingling of
military and civilian objects during the first Gulf War:
(a) The Iraqi Government moved significant amounts of
military weapons and equipment into civilian areas with
the deliberate purpose of using innocent civilians and
their homes as shields against attacks on legitimate
military targets;
(b) Iraqi fighter and bomber aircraft were dispersed into
villages near military airfields where they were parked
between civilian houses and even placed immediately
adjacent to important archaeological sites and historic
treasures;
(c) Coalition aircraft were fired upon by anti-aircraft
weapons in residential neighbourhoods in various cities.
In Baghdad, anti-aircraft sites were located on hotel
roofs;
(d) In one case, military engineering equipment used to
traverse rivers, including mobile bridge sections, was
located in several villages near an important crossing
point. The Iraqis parked each vehicle adjacent to a
civilian house.87
Locating military objectives—and weapons, equipment, and
headquarters for military personnel certainly qualify as military

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SCHOOLS AND ARMED CONFLICT 5 (2011), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/crd0711webwcover.pdf.
87
Letter from Perm. Rep. of the U.S., to the President of the U.N. Security Council, 2–3,
U.N. Doc. S/22341 (Mar. 8, 1991).
86
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objectives—within civilian buildings or densely populated civilian areas
violates Article 58(b) and undermines efforts to protect civilians.
Not only are wars being fought within and among the civilian
population—whether in southern Lebanon, Sri Lanka, northwest
Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Gaza Strip, or other conflicts—but the
defending party in the overwhelming majority of these situations is
deliberately taking advantage of the civilian population, strategically
and tactically, to gain an advantage over a more powerful military.
Thus, in both 1991 and in 2003, the Iraqi regime purposely parked fighter
jets in between residential buildings in Baghdad and other cities.88 The
Iraqi military stored ammunition in school classrooms, “including
rocket-propelled grenades, 82mm and 100mm mortar shells, and 12.7mm
machine gun bullets [and] . . . dug fighting positions with anti-aircraft
guns in . . . schoolyard[s].”89 Hezbollah fighters place rocket launchers
on the roofs of civilian buildings and fire rockets in close proximity to
protected locales, and Hamas militants position mobile rocket launchers
in schoolyards, mosques, next to residential buildings, and in other
civilian locales.90 The tactical purpose is to protect the fighter jets, rocket
launchers, or other military objectives by deterring attacks. The strategic
purpose, which is significantly more insidious, is to use resulting civilian
deaths as a broader strategic tool to accuse the attacking party of war
crimes, diminish support for the war effort in that country, or otherwise
change the course of the conflict.91 Thus, in pursuing their goal of
“gain[ing] political leverage by portraying U.S. forces as insensitive to
LOAC and human rights[,] . . . opponents unconstrained by
humanitarian ethics now take the strategy to the next level, that of

Id.; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, OFF TARGET: THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR AND CIVILIAN
CASUALTIES IN IRAQ 74 (2003), available at www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1203.
89
SCHOOLS AND ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 86, at 61, n.131.
90
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, MILITARY OPERATIONS BY LEBANESE GUERRILLA FORCES
(1997), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/isrleb/Isrleb-02.htm (“Because they
positioned and launched rockets and mortar shells from sites close to the Qana base on
April 18, Lebanese guerrilla forces also bear responsibility for the civilian casualties caused
by the massive Israeli retaliatory fire. . . . [T]he guerrillas exhibited a willful disregard for
the safety of the civilian population.”); see also ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, THE “GAZA
WAR”:
A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS 43–47, 49, 51–52, 54–55 (2009), available at
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/090202_gaza_war.pdf (describing how Hamas
fired mortars from the Jabaliya school and uses mosques, houses, and cemeteries for
military operations and to store weapons); Lebanese Website Blames Hizbullah for Qana
Deaths, YNET NEWS (Aug. 1, 2006), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L3284514,00.html.
91
See Laurie R. Blank, A New Twist on an Old Story: Lawfare and the Mixing of
Proportionalities, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 707 (2011).
88
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orchestrating situations that deliberately endanger noncombatants.”92
Civilians thus become a pawn at the strategic level as well, because they
are used not only for tactical advantage (e.g., shelter) in specific
situations, but also for broader strategic and political advantage as well.
Both the tactical and strategic goals are only realized at the direct
expense of the civilian population; both goals therefore run directly afoul
of the “intransgressible principle[]”93 of distinction.
At the same time, it is important to emphasize that a defending
party’s violation of these obligations under Article 58 and customary
international law in no way absolves the attacking party of its duty to
take precautions and abide by the principles of distinction and
proportionality.94 In highlighting the lack of enforcement for violations
of defending party’s precautions, therefore, this Article does not seek to
shift responsibility from one party to the other. Rather, the goal is to
achieve more complete and comprehensive implementation and
enforcement of the principle of distinction and the obligations both
parties have to protect civilians accordingly.
Although extraordinarily common during conflict, few violations of
Article 58(b) draw attention or condemnation. Unlike human shielding,
addressed below, violations of Article 58 are not war crimes. To that
end, international tribunals, focused on the more heinous crimes of
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, have simply made
mere mentions of the obligations to avoid locating military objectives in
heavily populated areas and to take other similar precautions, but have
never pursued criminal accountability for such actions.95 Nonetheless,
given both the prevalence of these violations and the consequences for
both civilians and the overall enforcement of the law, more resounding
condemnation of these violations could have a significant effect.

92
Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in
21st Century Conflicts 12–13 (Carr Ctr. for Human Rights Policy, Harvard Kennedy Sch.
Program on Nat’l Security & Human Rights, Workshop Paper, 2001), available at
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cchrp/Web%20Working%20Papers/Use%20of%20Force/D
unlap2001.pdf.
93
Nuclear Weapons, supra note 2, ¶ 79.
94
Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, ¶ 61 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003) (“As suggested by the Defence, the parties to a conflict are
under an obligation to remove civilians, to the maximum extent feasible from the vicinity
of military objectives and to avoid locating military objectives within or near densely
populated areas. However, the failure of a party to abide by this obligation does not
relieve the attacking side of its duty to abide by the principles of distinction and
proportionality when launching an attack.” (footnote omitted)).
95
See id.; see also Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-98-29/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 949 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 12, 2007).
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International investigations and fact-finding missions have been
more mixed. In one notable example, the U.N. Panel of Experts Report
on Accountability in Sri Lanka specifically refers to the ban on locating
military objectives in heavily populated areas, noting that “[c]redible
allegations point to a violation of this provision insofar as they indicate
patterns of conduct whereby . . . the LTTE deliberately located or used
mortar pieces, other light artillery, military vehicles, mortar pits,
bunkers, and trenches in proximity to civilian areas.”96 The report
explains further, in a clear statement of the grave dangers of using
military equipment in the midst of civilian areas:
The LTTE fired artillery from the [No Fire Zones], in
proximity to [internally displaced person] populations,
and fired from or stored military equipment near
[internally displaced persons] or civilian installations
such as hospitals. They did this even though they knew
that it would provoke a response from the [Sri Lanka
Artillery] and that any retaliating artillery would cause
harm to civilians. Sometimes they fired from among
civilians before quickly moving away, leaving the
civilians on the receiving end of the return fire.97
This description fits equally well with the conduct of Hamas and
other Palestinian armed groups during the conflict in Gaza. However,
the Goldstone Report fails to mention Article 58 at all, even though the
ban on locating military objectives in densely populated Gaza was
highly relevant. The Goldstone Report concludes “that there are
indications that Palestinian armed groups launched rockets from urban
areas.”98 It neglects to recognize, however, that in this particular conflict,
the rocket launchers themselves were military objectives for Israel—one
of the main goals of Operation Cast Lead was to eliminate the ability of
Palestinian armed groups to fire rockets at civilian areas in southern
Israel. Therefore, when Palestinian armed groups launched rockets from
civilian areas in Gaza, they were locating military objectives in densely
populated areas, in direct violation of Article 58(b) of Additional
Protocol I.99 The failure to condemn this violation—indeed to even
SRI LANKA REPORT, supra note 67, ¶ 239.
Id. ¶ 177(c).
98
Goldstone Report, supra note 72, ¶ 450.
99
In addition, the “LOAC requires that the defence should be conducted from the
position which would cause the least danger to civilians and civilian objects.” AUSTRALIA,
DEFENCE FORCE MANUAL § 553, cited in CIHL, supra note 11, at 430. One could also argue
that such attacks violated Article 57(2)(a)(ii) as well, which obligates parties to “take all
96
97

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol46/iss3/3

Blank: Taking Distinction to the Next Level: Accountability for Fighter

2012]

Accountability for Failing to Distinguish

797

mention it in many situations, whether Gaza or elsewhere—amounts to a
failure to fully recognize the obligations of the defending party,
especially in the complicated scenarios of contemporary conflicts. Just as
the densely populated nature of Gaza does not relieve Israel of its
obligations to distinguish between civilian and military objectives and to
take precautions, it correspondingly does not relieve Palestinian armed
groups of their obligations under Article 58.
The absence of—or at best minimal—condemnation of the practice of
placing military equipment and objectives in civilian areas thus
encourages those who wish to take advantage of the civilian
population’s presence.
Without robust enforcement of this key
obligation for the protection of civilians, parties will continue to locate
rocket launchers, military equipment, and other military objectives in
civilian areas with impunity. The effect, unfortunately, is to endanger
civilians rather than protect them. For civilians caught in the zone of
combat, and for military planners and commanders making targeting
determinations, the continued force of this obligation is critical.
Unfortunately, the absence of any mention of this obligation simply
gives parties free rein to exploit the civilian population and to
undermine, at the most fundamental level, one of the central principles
of LOAC.
3.

Human Shields

Human shielding refers to the practice of civilians protecting
military objectives from attack by gathering at the site of the objective
and using their civilian immunity to deter attacks. In effect, human
shielding directly undermines LOAC’s delicate balance between military
necessity and humanity by using the protections of the latter principle
for military purposes. Multiple provisions of the Geneva Conventions
and Additional Protocol I prohibit the use of the civilian population as a
shield, with the primary prohibition appearing in Article 51(7) of
Additional Protocol I:
The presence or movements of the civilian population or
individual civilians shall not be used to render certain
points or areas immune from military operations, in
particular in attempts to shield military objectives from
attacks or to shield, favour or impede military

feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding,
and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and
damage to civilian objects.” AP I, supra note 1, art. 57(2)(a)(ii).
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operations. The Parties to the conflict shall not direct the
movement of the civilian population or individual
civilians in order to attempt to shield military objectives
from attacks or to shield military operations.100
The prohibition on human shielding is part of customary
international law and is included in numerous military manuals of
countries around the world. In addition, it is a war crime under the
Rome Statute of the International Court.101 The use of human shields
flies directly in the face of a party’s basic obligations under the principle
of distinction by deliberately mingling civilians with military objects. As
a U.N. report investigating an attack on U.N. forces in Somalia in 1993
stated:
No principle is more central to the humanitarian law of
war than the obligation to respect the distinction
between combatants and non-combatants. That principle
is violated and criminal responsibility thereby incurred
when organizations deliberately target civilians or when
they use civilians as shields or otherwise demonstrate a
wanton indifference to the protection of noncombatants.102
Unfortunately, human shielding is all too common in a wide variety
of armed conflicts around the world and has a long history. British
troops placed Boer civilians on trains to prevent Boer commandos from
attacking them during the Boer War, and General Sherman marched
Confederate prisoners at the head of his forces on his march through
Georgia during the U.S. Civil War.103 More recently, during the 1991
100
AP I, supra note 1, art. 57(1); see GC III, supra note 1, art. 23 (“No prisoner of war may
at any time be sent to, or detained in areas where he may be exposed to the fire of the
combat zone, nor may his presence be used to render certain points or areas immune from
military operations.”); GC IV, supra note 1, art. 28 (“The presence of a protected person may
not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations.”); AP I,
supra note 1, art. 12(4) (“Under no circumstances shall medical units be used in an attempt
to shield military objectives from attack. Whenever possible, the Parties to the conflict shall
ensure that medical units are so sited that attacks against military objectives do not imperil
their safety.”).
101
Rome Statute, supra note 17, art. 8(b)(xxiii) (“Utilizing the presence of a civilian or
other protected person to render certain points, areas or military forces immune from
military operations.”).
102
Report PURSUANT to PARAGRAPH 5 of Security Council Resolution 837 (1993) on the
Investigation into the 5 June 1993 Attack on United Nations Forces in Somalia Conducted on behalf
of the Secretary-General, Annex. § 9, U.N. Doc. S/26351 (Aug. 24, 1993).
103
Robert E. Rodes, Jr., On Clandestine Warfare, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 333, 341 (1982).
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Persian Gulf War, Saddam Hussein seized foreign citizens and used
them to shield designated military targets, calling them “‘special
guests.’”104 Bosnian Serbs used civilian detainees as human shields to
protect the army’s advance during the war in Bosnia, and there were
widespread reports of human shields on bridges and around military
targets during the NATO bombing campaign against Serbia in 1999.105
In Liberia, rebel “fighters forced civilians out of the government hospital,
where they had taken refuge, and used them as human shields for their
positions” during fighting in Tubmanburg.106 The Security Council has
condemned “use by the Taliban and other extremist groups of civilians
as human shields” in Afghanistan.107 In one of the more horrifying and
vivid examples of wholesale human shielding, LTTE fighters forcibly
prevented civilians from leaving LTTE-controlled areas in the designated
No Fire Zones, “ensuring their continued presence as a human buffer.”108
As the U.N. Report on Sri Lanka concludes, the use of civilians “as a
strategic human buffer” and “as dispensable ‘cannon fodder’ . . . added
significantly to the total death toll in the conflict.”109 Additional
examples abound in conflicts from Chechnya to Lebanon and beyond.110
A few national and international courts have prosecuted and
convicted soldiers, militia, and other fighters for the use of human
See Michael N. Schmitt, Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law, 47 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 292, 295 (2009) (noting that the U.N. Security Council condemned this
conduct in Resolution 664).
105
U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human
Rights in the Former Yugoslavia, Fifth Periodic Report, §§ 36, 37, 39, 84, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1994/47 (Nov. 17, 1993); NATO Says Human Shields Account for Bombing Deaths,
CNN.COM (May 17, 1999), http://articles.cnn.com/1999-05-17/world/9905_17_kosovo.03_
1_nato-spokesman-jamie-shea-human-shields-bombing-pentagon?_s=PM:WORLD.
106
U.N. Secretary General, Fifteenth Progress Report on UNOMIL, § 24, U.N. Doc.
S/1996/47 (Jan. 23, 1996).
107
S.C. Res. 1776, ¶ 82, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1776 (Sept. 19, 2007).
108
SRI LANKA REPORT, supra note 67, ¶ 98.
109
Id. ¶ 177(a).
110
See, e.g., U.N. Secretary General, Report Prepared Pursuant to General Assembly
Resolution ES-JO/JO, U.N. Doc. A/ES-10/186 (July 30, 2002); REUVEN ERLICH, HEZBOLLAH’S
USE OF LEBANESE CIVILIANS AS HUMAN SHIELDS (2006); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WHY THEY
DIED: CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN LEBANON DURING THE 2006 WAR 52–60 (2007); Stéphanie
Bouchié de Belle, Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-Shirts: Human Shields in
International Humanitarian Law, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 883, 884 (2008) (referencing human
shielding in Chechnya and Afghanistan); Ron Synovitz, U.S. Says Al-Qaeda Used Afghan
Children as Human Shields, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY (June 18, 2007),
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1077179.html; see also Schmitt, supra note 104, at 315
(“[I]n November 2006 Hamas radio issued an appeal for women to converge on a mosque
in Beit Hanoun where Israeli security forces had trapped militants. The Palestinian women
entered the mosque, clothed some of the militants in female attire, and acted as shields for
them as they escaped.”) (citing Gaza Women Killed in Mosque Siege, BBC NEWS (Nov. 3,
2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/6112386.stm).
104
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shields in some cases, although the number of prosecutions is quite small
relative to the number of violations. In two separate cases, the ICTY
convicted both Serbs and Croats for using civilian detainees to shield
military objectives or military operations.111 In the ongoing prosecution
of Radovan Karadzic, the ICTY has also already condemned the use of
U.N. peacekeepers as human shields, finding that the accused
“physically secured or otherwise held the U.N. peacekeepers against
their will at potential NATO air targets, including ammunition bunkers,
[a] radar site and a nearby communications centre in order to render
these locations immune from further NATO air strikes.”112 However, in
all of these cases, the tribunal treated the human shielding as a
component of other war crimes, such as inhumane treatment, rather than
convicting the accused directly for the crime of using human shields.113
Israeli courts have condemned the practice as well, outlawing the use of
civilians as human shields and as part of an early warning system.114
Given the widespread use of human shields, significantly greater
efforts are needed to prosecute perpetrators of this serious war crime.
Like the other LOAC violations addressed in this Article, human
shielding poses a direct and severe challenge to the principle of
distinction and to the protection of civilians during armed conflict.
Indeed, those who use human shields exploit the obligation of
distinction and upend LOAC’s balance between military necessity and
humanity by deliberately mingling civilians and military objects and,
still worse, using civilians directly to protect military targets. These
111
See Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 652–654 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004); Prosecutor v. Naletilić & Martinović,
Case No. IT-98-34-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 765, 769 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Mar. 31, 2003). Two early prosecutions for human shielding occurred after World War II.
British Military Court, Luneberg, Student Case (Case No. 24) (May 6–10, 1946), reprinted in
4 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS: SELECTED AND PREPARED BY THE UNITED
NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION 118 (1947) [hereinafter LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS] (convicting General Karl Student for mistreating prisoners of war, including
using them as a screen to protect advancing German troops); U.S. Military Tribunal,
Nuremberg, Trial of Wilhelm Von Leeb and Thirteen Others (Case No. 72, High Command
Trial) (Dec. 30, 1947–Oct. 28, 1948), reprinted in 12 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS, supra (declaring that using prisoners of war as a shield is contrary to
international law).
112
Karadzic & Mladic Indictment, supra note 70, Counts 15–16.
113
Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 716; see Prosecutor v. Aleksovski,
Case No. IT-95-14/I-T, Judgment, ¶ 229 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
June 25, 1999) (characterizing human shielding as “an outrage upon personal dignity”).
114
See Adalah—The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. The Minister of
Defense, HCJ 3799/02, June 23, 2005 (outlawing the use of civilians to give warnings before
military operations); see also Ethan Bronner, Israeli Soldiers Convicted of Using Boy as Shield,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2010, at A7 (reporting that two Israeli soldiers were convicted for using a
Palestinian boy to check bags for explosives during Operation Cast Lead in Gaza).
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perpetrators thus take the already highly problematic practice of fighting
from within a civilian population to the next level—from exposing
civilians to the consequences of military operations to using them as a
shield, and thus potentially guaranteeing their death or injury. Until
such crimes are prosecuted extensively—and as the specific crime of
human shielding rather than as a component of another crime—the
practice will not stop, and civilians will continue to be used as pawns by
parties seeking any advantage, even at the cost of causing the death of
their own civilians in many cases.
IV. TAKING DISTINCTION TO THE NEXT LEVEL: LOOKING FORWARD
In the years since World War II, we have seen an extensive and
comprehensive development of the law pertaining to the protection of
civilians in armed conflict, ranging from the Fourth Geneva
Convention—the first law of war treaty specifically devoted to the
protection of civilians—to numerous international, hybrid, and national
judicial mechanisms for the prosecution of the most heinous crimes
committed against innocent civilians. Many militaries engage in
extensive training and implement highly tailored ROE during military
operations to provide soldiers with a range of tools for differentiating
hostile persons from innocent civilians to fulfill the obligation to take
constant care to protect civilians. All of these developments implement
and enforce the principle of distinction, one of the central foundations of
LOAC. Without a doubt, preventing and criminalizing deliberate and
indiscriminate attacks on civilians is essential to protecting civilians
during armed conflict. But maximizing the role of distinction in times of
war demands more. It demands that the obligation to distinguish
civilians from fighters and civilian objects from military objects occur not
only at the level of targeting but at the level of conduct as well.
At present, innocent civilians face grave danger because of the
conduct of the forces fighting ostensibly on their behalf, because both
government forces and militants use the cover of the civilian population
to gain advantage during combat operations, regardless of the risk to
those innocent civilians. Such forces not only have a political or moral
obligation to protect their own civilians; LOAC places a legal obligation
on them to do so as well. In the absence of robust efforts to enforce those
obligations, however, LOAC’s mandates will not be fulfilled.
To that end, militaries need to prosecute their own soldiers who
violate distinction’s central tenets, whether by fighting as civilians, using
human shields, or locating military equipment and objectives in civilian
buildings.
International and regional tribunals must give these
violations greater attention and condemnation, even when tasked with
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prosecuting only the most serious and widespread crimes. In some
situations, such as the crime of utilizing human shields, for example,
tribunals cannot simply subsume it within other violations, but should
convict for the war crime of using human shields to make a greater
impact and highlight the specific dangers of such practices. The impact
of such tribunals goes beyond each individual prosecution and
conviction they render and contributes to an overarching framework of
international criminal justice and accountability.
Leaving these
violations aside means that the framework is incomplete.
Finally, international investigations and fact-finding missions have a
critically important role to play in this area, especially given the rapidly
growing use of such investigations and reports in the aftermath of
conflicts and significant military operations. Such commissions and factfinding missions are not judicial mechanisms and do not play the role of
court or tribunal, pronouncing guilt or innocence. In many situations,
however, their reports will serve as the most comprehensive—or
ostensibly most comprehensive—outside analysis of the events and
conduct during the incident in question, giving the reports a more
substantial story-telling role than that of a criminal case. Here is where
the absence of condemnation or even attention to the violations of
distinction has the greatest effect. When a report simply does not
mention Article 58(b) and its ban on locating military objectives in
heavily populated civilian areas, notwithstanding extensive evidence of
precisely that conduct, the effect is to ratify and even encourage such
behavior. When perfidious tactics garner no condemnation or even
recognition, armed forces—whether insurgents or government forces—
will continue to use such tactics. The failure to address perfidy creates
the impression that such tactics are acceptable during conflict, a highly
dangerous conclusion.
Complaining about the nature of asymmetric warfare and the tactics
of the disadvantaged party may identify violations of the principle of
distinction, but does not involve action to stop or minimize such
violations. Perfidy, human shields, and locating military objectives in
civilian buildings and areas are not simply tactics that militaries find
inconvenient or do not like on the part of their enemies. They are
violations of LOAC and must be condemned and prosecuted as such.
Failure to do so will leave distinction’s obligations and promises
unfulfilled and, more importantly, will continue to leave civilians in
grave danger.
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